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ABSTRACT
The occurrence of discrimination is an important problem in the social and economical sciences. Much of the discrimination
observed in empirical studies can be explained by the theory of in-group favoritism, which states that people tend to act more
positively towards peers whose appearances are more similar to their own. Some studies, however, find hierarchical structures
in inter-group relations, where members of low-status groups also favor the high-status group members. These observations
cannot be understood in the light of in-group favoritism. Here we present an agent based model in which evolutionary dynamics
can result in a hierarchical discrimination between two groups characterized by a meaningless, but observable binary label. We
find that discriminating strategies end up dominating the system when the selection pressure is high, i.e. when agents have a
much higher probability of imitating their neighbor with the highest payoff. These findings suggest that the puzzling persistence
of hierarchical discrimination may result from the evolutionary dynamics of the social system itself, namely the social imitation
dynamics. It also predicts that discrimination will occur more often in highly competitive societies.
Introduction
Structural discrimination is a problem across a wide range of societies. Often, there is no apparent connection between the
defining characters of a group and an obvious rational reason to discriminate against its members. One of the most commonly
observed discriminating behaviors1, 2, in-group favoritism, is characterized by a tendency to show more cooperation, preference,
or altruistic behavior towards people whose appearance is close to ones own (the in-group) than to those who appear different
(the out-group). However, a growing body of research seems to indicate that members of some minority groups, particularly
those of low social status, favor their in-group much less than members of high status groups, or even favor members of their
high-status out-group (in-group devaluation)3–11. In-group favoritism clearly cannot explain why such hierarchies should be
accepted by those they disadvantage. This has lead to the development of system justification theory, which states that people
have a intrinsic tendency to legitimize and preserve systemic forms of inequality12. System justification theory provides an
efficient explanation for the observed out-group favoritism from low-status group to high-status groups by introducing a fairly
strong assumption about human psychology. This raises the question about whether this kind of behavior could be explained
from simpler, or more fundamental, principles.
Some investigations following the classical economic principle of selfish rationality have revealed an important connection
between discrimination and incomplete information. A rational agent who has to choose between individual options belonging
to different groups1 may try to compensate incomplete information about the quality of each choice by factoring in a prior
knowledge about the quality distributions within each group. If the quality-distributions of the two groups are very different
this knowledge is weighted heavily, it could lead the agent to choose an option with a weaker individual performance estimate,
but belonging to an – on average – stronger group, instead of someone with a stronger individual performance estimate,
but belonging to a weaker group13. This statistical theory of discrimination has been used as a fundamental building block
for designing dynamical models in which the collective reputation of group will be trapped in one of a number of possible
Nash-equilibria stabilized by positive-feedback between the expected and the optimal behavior14, 15. These types of models
suggest that persistent discrimination can be explained without assuming any differences of intrinsic properties of the members
of different groups. All the existing models of this kind, however, describe asymmetric interactions, where the ‘discriminating’
agent belongs to a completely different category than the ‘discriminated’ agents. Thus, none of them directly describes in-group
devaluation. Also, there may not be a simple way of introducing it in this framework, because a rational agent would be
expected to recognize that in-group devaluation would negatively affect its own future possibilities, and avoid acting against its
own self-interest. One way to circumvent this problem could be to loosen the assumption of rationality. This could be further
motivated if the discriminating behavior often occurs unconsciously, or indirectly via complex social interactions which are not
fully understood by the agents.
Evolutionary game theory is one framework which has been enormously effective in explaining social phenomena such as
1this could be an employer choosing between different employees, or a customer choosing between different suppliers
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altruism and cooperation16. In contrast to the classical economical theories it approaches the behavioral question starting with
almost completely irrational agents who do not have any direct knowledge about the consequences of their actions. Rather than
making assumptions about the actual decision process, it works by assuming that behaviors are fundamentally random, but
successful strategies are promoted by replicating at a higher rate. This replication is commonly interpreted either as biological
reproduction of genes or, in the context of cultural evolution, as mimicking of ideas or behavioral motives. A number of studies
have investigated how the introduction of more or less arbitrary tags can be used to promote the evolution of cooperation17–22.
More recently a study has investigated the effect of tags when considered in combination with population structure — another
mechanism well known to promote cooperation23. There it was shown that the introduction of tags could also reduce the overall
level of cooperation, by allowing discriminating strategies to invade a population of unconditional cooperators. It has been
pointed out by Fu et al.20 that this mechanism can be used to explain the evolution of in-group favoritism within dynamic
groups where memberships may change quickly, e.g. political movements. The existing models of tag-based cooperation do,
however, not reproduce predict the observed phenomenon of sustained hierarchical discrimination, i.e. a mixed population in
which members of one group are treated preferentially, both by their peers, as well as by members of the less fortunate groups.
Here we suggest a new model for investigating hierarchical discrimination in the framework of evolutionary game theory.
Starting from an established model describing the evolution of cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma type game on graphs24,
we partition the population into two groups by randomly assigning an observable, but completely meaningless, binary label
to each agent (blue or green). As the labels are observable, this expands the set of possible strategies from two (cooperate
and defect), to four (1: cooperate with all, 2: cooperate only with blue, 3: cooperate only with green, 4: defect all). We call
strategies discriminating when they imply different behavior towards agents carrying different labels.
In contrast to models of tag-based cooperation, the labels described in this model never change. Hence the only dynamical
variable in the model are the strategies, which agents change mainly by imitating their neighbours. As strategies spread from
agent to agent, the model has a tendency to let one strategy dominate all (or at least large regions) of the population. Thus our
main task is to investigate which conditions (choices of parameters) promotes the dominance of discriminating strategies.
Model
Let us define a game of agents distributed on a graph. Each agent has a static and binary ‘label’, either green or blue, decided at
the beginning of the game. This label serves as the only observable difference between agents. Agents interact with their nearest
neighbors in a prisoner’s dilemma type of game where they can either cooperate or defect. When cooperating, an agent donates
one unit of value to the neighbor. To simulate the benefit of cooperation, the donation is scaled by a constant factor b > 1, such
that the neighbor receives b times the unit value. When the an agent is defecting, no value is transferred. Since agents cannot
distinguish between neighbors who have the same label they must act the same way towards all of them. Thus the model has
four possible strategies: “defect all”, “cooperate with all”, “cooperate only with green”, and “cooperate only with blue”.
Given a configuration of labels and strategies, a payoff, p, can be calculated for each agent. An agent’s payoff is the sum of
p=b-2 p=3b-3 p=b-2
p=b p=b-2 p=2b
p=0 p=b p=-1
Figure 1. Model description: Agents are located on a
square lattice. Each agent has a label (blue or green)
which can be observed by their neighbors, and a strategy
(yellow: "cooperate with all", green: "cooperate with
green", blue: "cooperate with blue", purple: "defect all")
which determines their interaction with their neighbors.
From this configuration, an agent’s payoff p is calculated
by subtracting 1 for each neighbor it cooperates with, and
adding b for each neighbor cooperating with it. Here the
parameter b represents the benefit of cooperation. Each
time-step one randomly chosen agent changes its strategy
by copying that of one of its neighbors. This neighbor is
chosen with a probability proportional to f = exp(wp),
where the parameter w represents the selection pressure.
When the selection pressure is small (w→ 0) neighbors
are chosen with almost equal probability independent of
their payoff. When the selection pressure is high (w→ ∞)
the neighbor with the highest payoff will almost certainly
be chosen.
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all donations the agent is receiving from its neighbors, minus all the donations it is giving away. Notice that the payoff of an
agent i does not accumulate over time, and can always be calculated from the current state by:
pi = ∑
j∈Ni
b ·S j(λi)−Si(λ j),
, whereNi is the set of neighbors of agent i, λi ∈ {blue, green} is the label of agent i, and Si(λ j) = 1 if the strategy of agent i is
to cooperate with the label worn by agent j, and Si(λ j) = 0 if it is to defect.
The evolutionary dynamics of the spreading of the strategies is as follows. Every turn a random agent is chosen (from a
uniform distribution over all agents). With a small probability µ , this agent will mutate, i.e. choose a new random strategy
(from a uniform distribution over all strategies).Else, with probability 1−µ , the chosen agent will imitate the behavior of one
of its neighbors. In that case, a neighbor is chosen with a probability proportional to its fitness f which is directly related to its
payoff by:
fi = ew·pi
where fi and pi are the fitness and payoff of agent i, and w is a model parameter controlling the selection pressure. When the
selection pressure approaches zero, all neighbors are chosen with almost equal probability. When the selection pressure is high,
the neighbor with the highest payoff will almost certainly be chosen.
Our model is characterized by three parameters: The cooperation benefit b, the selection pressure w, and the mutation rate
µ .
The random mutations serve two functions: Adding noise and preventing strategies from going extinct. We are interested in
the evolutionary dynamics of the imitation dynamics, and not in the noise. Thus we keep the mutation-rate small and constant
(µ = 0.001) throughout this paper.
Besides the three parameters mentioned above, we have two ‘hidden’ parameters, namely the underlying graph topology
and the distribution of labels. In this paper we have chosen to focus on a 2-dimensional square lattice, because it allow for
intuitive visualization of the model-state. Our lattice has periodic boundary conditions in one direction, to form a cylinder. The
labels are then randomly distributed such that the probability that an agent is given a green label increases linearly from zero in
one end of the cylinder (‘top’), to one in the other end (‘bottom’). This allows us to effectively investigate the effect which
emerge due to a mesoscale imbalance in the label density.
We refer interested readers to the supplement for results with uniform label-distribution on a 2D lattice 1.1, Erdo˝s-Rényi
random graphs 1.2, and a 1D ring-topology 1.3. The parameter scans show qualitatively similar results, indicating that the
behaviour doesn’t depend critically on the topology.
The model described here is an extension of a model introduced by Ohtsuki et al. in an effort to study how spacial structures
may promote evolution of cooperation24. The most important change is the introduction of the observable labels. However, we
also differ by defining the fitness using using the exponential function fi = ew·pi , whereas they choose f = 1−w+w · p. In
the limit of low selection pressure (w→ 0), these two definitions converge. The choice of the exponential function, however,
secures that all fitnesses will be positive no matter how high the selection pressure. This allows us to investigate all the way to
the deterministic limit, where agents always imitate
Results
Figure 2 captures the long-term behavior of the model, as it settles into different stationary states dependent on parameters.
In the bottom left panel the normalized mean payoff is plotted (in color) as a function of the selectionn pressure w and the
cooperation benefit b. The normalized mean payoff is identical to the fraction of donations in the system out of all possible
ones. Due to the stochastic nature of the model, the system is never locked in an absorbing fixed point. The normalized mean
payoff, however, tends to stabilize after some transient period, as the system finds a stationary distribution of strategies. To
capture this long term behavior, we initialized the system with all defectors and run the model for a transient period of 2×107
time steps before the mean payoff is measured. We then measure the averaged value over 20 samples evenly spaced over a
period of 108 time steps. The phase diagram clearly shows four distinct regions characterized by different levels of cooperation.
In the right panel, four examples of stationary state strategy distributions are shown, one for each phase. These snapshots
show the following characteristics, which we have observed consistently throughout all our simulations:
A: The system is dominated by full cooperation resulting in close to maximal mean payoff. As expected, this optimal state
requires that the cooperation benefit is greater than 4 (average connectivity), as predicted by Ohtsuki et al.’s simple rule for the
evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks24. Surprisingly, we find that it is also necessary to have a relatively low
selection pressure to obtain this state of almost full cooperation.
B: When the cooperation benefit is low, the dominant strategy is complete defection, resulting in approximately zero payoff.
Surprisingly we find that when the selection pressure is high (w & 0.03), full defection is outperformed by strategies with
non-zero cooperation even when the cooperation benefit is less than four (the average connectivity).
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Figure 2. Phase-diagram. Constant mutation rate, µ = 0.001, and grid-size, 100×100 agents. Top-left: The label
distribution used in each of the examples to the right. In the parameter scan, a new label distribution is generated at every point,
to ensure that the results are not unexpectedly caused by random local structures. Bottom-left: Parameter scan over
cooperation benefit b, and selection pressure w. The color indicates the mean payoff normalized, averaged over 20 samples
uniformly distributed over a period of 108 time steps. At each data point the system is initialized with all defectors and run for a
transient period of 2×107 time steps before the mean payoff is measured. Right: Four snapshots of strategy-distributions at
parameters corresponding to those marked in the parameter scan.
C: In general, when the selection pressure is high, we observe that the system is dominated by the asymmetric, or
discriminating, strategies. The result is the formation of regional hierachies, where all agents cooperate with neighbors carrying
one of the labels, independent of their own label. Thus the ‘upperclass’ benefit from the cooperation from all of their neighbours
while only donating to their in-group. The exploited agents, on the other hand, display in-group devaluation by only cooperating
with members of their out-group.
These hierachical regions have an interesting connection with the local label densitiy. With our choice of label distribution,
the lattice of agents is split into two qualitatively different regions. In ‘the top’ of the cylinder, the majority of agents have
the blue label, while in ‘the bottom’ the green label is much more common. When the cooperation benefit is high, b & 4
(average connectivity), we find a threshold for the selection pressure, above which the dominating strategy within each of the
two domains (‘top’ and ‘bottom’) is to cooperate with the local majority label, while defecting against those in the minority. As
a result, the normalized mean payoff is approximately equal to the population fraction of the majority in each domain, i.e. 3/4
given this specific label-distribution.
D: For high selection pressures and intermediate selection benefits b slightly below 4 (the average connectivity), we observe
that domains of the asymmetric cooperation strategies have switched around as compared to the case with larger cooperation
benefit b > 4 (the average connectivity). Cooperating with agents carrying one label, and defecting those carrying another,
still out-competes both of the symmetric strategies, but within each of the two domains (‘top’ and ‘bottom’) the agents in the
majority are defected, and only those in the minority group receive donations. Consequently, the normalized mean payoff is
equal to the fraction of minority labels within each domain which is 1/4 with the given label-distribution.
4/13
Closer examination of the parameter scan in figure 2 reveals that the transition between the different phases are qualitatively
different. For low selection pressure (left side of the figure), there is a smooth transition between ‘low mean payoff’ when the
cooperation benefit is low, to ‘high mean payoff’ when the cooperation benefit is high. For intermediate cooperation benefits,
we find very noisy stationary distributions in which patches of all possible strategies coexist. These high-entropy distributions
are easy to understand. Because of the very low selection pressure the boundaries between strategy patches perform a random
walk almost without a drift. When w = 0 dynamics are equivalent to a classical voter-model25, 26 with four opinions.
The sharp phase transitions observed at higher selection pressures (w& 0.03) are more intriguing because 1: The sharp
transitions indicate that relatively small changes in the environment can have dramatic effects on the social structure, and 2:
The sharp transitions separate the regions dominated by discriminating strategies.
The most intriguing finding in this new model, is the symmetry breaking phase transition in which full cooperation is
ousted by a strategy of selectively cooperating with agents carrying one of the labels but not with those carrying the other
label. Surprisingly, we find that, as long as the cooperation benefit is high (somewhat higher than the average connectivity),
transition-point is determined almost solely by the selection pressure. In fact it seems that for selection pressures above a
certain threshold, full cooperation cannot be restored no matter how much the cooperation benefit is increased. To get a better
understanding of this, we have performed a detailed study of a simplified scenario.
In this example, all agents are arranged on a one-dimensional line rather than a square lattice. Each agent has only two
neighbors, and all agents except one have the blue label. The single agent with the green label is placed in the middle of the line,
and the mutation-rate is set to zero. Instead we fix the strategy of the outermost agent in one end of the line to always being
“full cooperation”, and the strategy of the outermost agent in the other end to “cooperating with blue, but defecting green”.
Any strategy squeezed in between these two will eventually disappear (by random fluctuation), and the complete state of the
system can be described by one number indicating the location of the boundary between one strategy and the other. Notice
that outside the neighborhood of the one green agent, these two strategies lead to identical behavior, and thus the boundary
between them will simply make an unbiased random walk. In the within 3 steps of the green agent, however, the boundary will
move left or right with a probability that must be calculated explicitly for each position. After having determined the individual
stepping probabilities we calculate the probability of finding it on the symmetric side of the green agent (the asymmetric
strategy dominates) and the probability of finding it on the asymmetric side (the symmetric strategy dominates), assuming a
stationary distribution:
P(discrimination dominates)
P(full cooperation dominates)
=
e2w
tanh(wb)+1
When the fraction is greater than one, we expect a strategy of asymmetric cooperation to be able to outperform the full
cooperation in a mixed population. Comparison with the phase diagram for the one-dimensional system show a close, but
non-perfect match (see supplementary figure 1.3). In the limit of very high cooperation-benefit, b 1, the condition reduces to
w > log(2)/2. This result confirms the visual impression from the parameter-scan, that for high enough selection pressures,
discriminating strategies dominate no matter how high the cooperate benefit is.
More details about the calculations can be found in the supplementary material.
Discussion
In this paper, we have introduced and studied a minimal model in which evolutionary dynamics can promote discriminating
behavior between arbitrary labels resulting in a reduction of the overall level of cooperation. Our model describes the cultural
evolution of competing behaviors/strategies, of which some are discriminating, in the sense that they imply different behaviors
towards agents carrying different labels. We have observed that the discriminating strategies end up dominating the system
when the selection pressure is high – that is, when agents have a much higher tendency to imitate the behavior of their most
successful neighbor – resulting in a hierarchical society where agents carrying one label end up with a higher payoff than
those carrying the other. This hierarchy emerges spontaneously even though the model treats the labels symmetrically, and
there is no extrinsic preference for choosing one strategy over any other. In fact, agents choose their strategy completely
independently of their label. As a consequence the low status agents (those with the lowest payoff) end up exhibiting out-group
favoritism, by cooperating only with those neighbors having a different label than their own. This type of behaviour is in
qualitative agreement with experimental data suggesting that members of certain low-status groups tend to express significantly
lower in-group favoritism, or even favoring high-status group members3–11. These observations are usually explained with
system justification theory12. System justification theory states that humans have an intrinsic drive for justifying – and thereby
validating – established structures around them. In contrast to the well-established psychological theory of system justification,
our model is a minimalistic toy-model. We have ignored many important aspects of human nature, as well as making unrealistic
assumptions, in an attempt to make the model as simple as possible, while still qualitatively capturing the observed phenomenon.
Our model is intended as an abstract investigation of the idea, that mechanisms for hierarchical discrimination could be initiated
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or reinforced via group-dynamical mechanisms outside of individual preferences. We do not, however, understand this as a
replacement for the established theory, but rather as a complimentary mechanism.
It is worth noting, that the behavior observed in the model described in this paper, differs in two fundamental aspects from
that described in the large literature of tag-based cooperation. Firstly, we find a strong tendency for our system to settle into
a stationary macro-distribution of strategies. This is in sharp contrast to the oscillatory (or wave-like) behaviour of previous
models18–23 (17). In these models, the system is almost always susceptible to invasion from new strategies. When the population
is dominated by complete defection, it is vulnerable to the random emergence of an agent with a currently non-existing tag and
an in-group favoring strategy. Later, when that agent-type has taken over most of the population, it becomes susceptible to
free-riders who have the same tag, but do not cooperate with their peers.
Secondly, when discriminating strategies become dominant in models of tag-based cooperation, they do so by the fortune
of a strong correlation between a given tag and an in-group favoring strategy. When we observe discriminating strategies
dominating in our model, it tends to form large (mesoscale) regions each dominated by a single strategy — either “cooperate
only with green” or “cooperate only with blue”. Within each of these regions, the population is generally a mix of agents with
different labels. Consequently a non-negligible fraction of the population is actually expressing out-group favoritism.
The key to understanding these differences lies in the implementation of the evolutionary algorithm. In models of tag-based
cooperation, tags are passed on to future generation together with the strategy of the parent, unless a rare mutation occurs. A
successful combination of tag and strategy will therefore quickly invade the system, resulting in a population where a large
majority of agents have the same tag. In the model presented in this paper, agents never change their label, and agents with
one label can adopt the strategy of neighbours with the other label. Thus a strategy is able to produce the richest individuals
by letting the agents carrying one label exploit those carrying the other. This also helps explaining the observed connection
between a high selection pressure, w, and the dominance of discriminating strategies. The selection pressure can be interpreted
as the agent’s ‘eagerness’ to copy their richest neighbour. When it is strong enough the contagion benefit of strategies that
produce richer agents outperforms the disadvantage of also producing poor ones. If we keep this analysis in mind we can also
argue, that a strategy with explicit in-group favoritism (“cooperate only with neighbours carrying the same label as myself”)
would not have an evolutionary advantage under these dynamics. With such a strategy no agents would have the advantage of
receiving donations from their neighbours without giving back.
The models of discrimination which have followed a classical economical approach by assuming rational agents14, 15 also
cannot capture the cause of discrimination that we have observed in our model. This is because it is crucial to the development of
hierarchical discrimination in our model that agents do not act intelligently in the direction of self-interest. Even in economical
models where agents have imperfect information about each other, they are typically assumed to at least have full information
about the fundamental rules of the game they are playing. It can be argued that evolutionary game theory makes the general
assumption that agents have no understanding about cause and effect in their social interactions, and thus must rely on observed
correlations between other agents’ behavior and their profit, in order to try to optimize their game. Such an assumption seems
more likely in the context of unconscious behaviors, or in complex social interactions where the causal connection between
actions and delayed rewards is in fact indirect.
Many interesting questions remain in the context of the non-group-based mechanism of discrimination in social systems
that we studied in a minimal model in this paper. In particular, we have enforced a spatial structure on the model-population
which is one out of a number of well known ways to promote cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma type games16, 24. At this point
it remains an open question whether a cooperation-reducing, hierarchical discrimination will also emerge via spontaneous
symmetry-breaking when introducing meaningless tags into models where cooperation is achieved by different means.
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1 Supplementary figures
All panels in all figures below show parameter scans. ‘label/strat-correlation’ measures to what extent agents positively
discriminate their own label. Add one for every agent who has a cooperating strategy towards their own badge, and subtract one
for each agent cooperating with the label they don’t carry themselves.
1.1 Uniform label distribution
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The parameter-scan shown here differs from the model described in the main text only by having a uniform label distribution.
Every agent has 50/50 percent chance of being blue or green. The label distribution is random and redrawn from a uniform
distribution at every data point.
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1.2 Random Graphs - average connectivity 4
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As the model described in this paper is defined in terms of local interactions, it is straightforward to extent the investigations
to arbitrary graph topologies. The parameter-scan shown here is executed on binomial random-graphs with 1000 nodes and
average connectivity 4. A new random graph, and a new random uniform label-distribution is drawn for every time series.
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1.3 1D - Ring
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For comparison with the theoretically predicted phase-transition mentioned in the paper (red line), we here show what the phase
diagram looks like for a 1D system, i.e. a line of agents with two neighbors each, closed at the ends to form a ring. The label
distribution is random and redrawn from a uniform distribution at every data point.
11/13
1.4 Timeseries - Converging to stable population fractions
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These four panels show the time-series of the population fraction of each of the four strategies, corresponding to each of the
snap-shots in figure 2 in the main text. Each simulation starts with a population of 100% defectors. The figures strongly suggest,
that the model dynamics reaches a stationary state, with some stochastic fluctuations around stationary strategy-distributions.
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1.5 Analytic solution of simplified 1D system
As mentioned in main text, the phase-transition can be analytically calculated in a simplified version of the 1D system with out
mutation (µ = 0).
x-2
r2r1l1l2
x x+1x-1
Imagine a line of agents, each connected to their two nearest neighbours. One agent in the middle of the line has the green
label, while all others have the blue label. The dynamical variable in this system is a point on the line, x, such that all agents
to the left of that point have the yellow strategy (cooperate with everyone), and all agents to the right have the blue strategy
(cooperate only with blue neighbours). At any point in time, we enumerate the agents according to how far they are from the
border. The first agent to the right (left) is called r1 (l1), the second r2 (l2), and so on.
Since the mutation is assumed to be zero, the border between the two strategies can only move if the agent immediately at
one side copies the strategy of the agent on the other.
The boundary moves left if the first agent left of the boundary (l1) imitates the strategy of the first player right of the
boundary (r1). This happens with probability:
P(x→ x−1) = 1
N
fr1
fr1 + fl2
=
1
N
1
1+ fl2/ fr1
=
1
N
1
1+ exp(w · (pl2− pr1)) ,
given the boundary is at position x, where fi and pi are the fitness and payoff of agent i, and l2 is the second agent left of the
boundary. Likewise the probability that the boundary will move right is:
P(x→ x+1|x) = 1
N
1
1+ exp(w · (pr2− pl1)) ,
where r2 is the second agent left of the boundary. After having determined the individual stepping probabilities we can calculate
the stationary distribution of the boundary by assuming microscopic balance:
P(x)P(x→ x+1|x) = P(x)P(x+1→ x|x+1),
where P(x) is the stationary probability that the boundary is at position x. From this we get an expression for the fraction
between the stationary probability of a position x and at a position x+n:
P(x)
P(x+n)
=
P(x+1→ x|x+1)
P(x→ x+1|x) ·
P(x+2→ x+1|x+2)
P(x+1→ x+2|x+1) · ... ·
P(x+n→ x+n−1|x+n)
P(x+n−1→ x+n|x+n−1) .
If we assume x is a position at least three steps to the completely cooperative side of the green agent (the discriminating strategy
dominates) and x+n is a position at least three steps to the discriminating side (the completely cooperative strategy dominates)
then we obtain the following expression after reducing factors which appear in both numerator and denominator.
P(discrimination dominates)
P(full cooperation dominates)
=
1+ e−2wb
2
(1+ ew)2
(1+ e−w)2
=
e2w
tanhwb+1
When the fraction is greater than one, we expect a strategy of asymmetric cooperation (i.e. discrimination) to be able to
outperform the full cooperation in a mixed population. Comparison with the phase diagram for the one-dimensional system
show a close, but non-perfect match (see supplementary figure 1.3). In the limit of very high cooperation benefit, b→ ∞, this
condition reduces to:
w > log2/2
This result shows, that no matter how high the cooperation-benefit is, there will always be a critical selection-pressure above
which discriminating strategies are more likely to spread than unconditional cooperation.
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